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FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-73

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B223 (40)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

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Remarks:

3637 (10-81)


 Executive Secretary

 4/30/82
 Date

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
Department of StateMr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence AgencyLieutenant Colonel Robert P. Meehan
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of DefenseColonel Charles F. Stebbins
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffMr. William Schneider
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and BudgetMr. Joseph Presel
Executive Assistant
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Meeting on START -- Friday, April 30, 4:00 P.M.

The meeting scheduled for Friday, April 30, at 10:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room on the subject of START has been changed to Friday, April 30, at 4:00 p.m. Agencies should be represented by agency heads plus one.

As agreed at today's meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, the attached items are provided for discussion at the above meeting: (1) a chart outlining agency views on a U.S. Negotiation Position and (2) a summary of negotiations criteria.

Michael O. Wheeler / [signature]
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

TS-820255
CY-4 of 4

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Review April 28, 2002

Classified and Extended by William P. Clark
Reason Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

TS-820255 (C) 847

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AGENCY VIEWS ON SIART NEGOTIATION POSITION (U)

AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONSTRAINT:						
AGENCY	BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS	ICBM WARHEADS	THROWWEIGHT		DELIVERY VEHICLES	
			DIRECT	ALTERNATIVE	MISSILE LAUNCHER	BOMBERS
OSD	4000		Equal limit at less than current US level	NO	NO	Equal numbers
ACDA	4000	2500	NO	Limit reentry vehicle weight. Limit missile throwweight to twice reentry vehicle weight. Use effects of reduced missile warhead numbers to impact throwweight.	NO	250
STATE	5000	2500	NO	Ban SS-18 (possibly forego M-X). Use effects of reduced missile warhead numbers to impact throwweight.	1500 total with 250 bomber sub-limit	
NEGOTIATOR	5000	2500	Equal limit at less than current US level	NO --	NO	250
JCS	Reduction to equal levels				Reduction to equal levels	Equal numbers

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TOP SECRETSTART NEGOTIATIONS CRITERIA

The following criteria are those which must guide formulation of a position for START:

- o Military capability. A START agreement must permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability, taking into account that allowed to the Soviet Union, to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
- o Equality. Nothing less than equality is acceptable in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation agreement for military reasons and for political/perceptual reasons.
- o Strategic stability. A START agreement must promote stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. Significant constraints on the most threatening Soviet systems — ICBMs — could contribute to this goal.
- o Effective verification. A START agreement must provide for necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative measures required to achieve this objective.
- o Substantial reductions on each side. Whatever unit of measurement is adopted should lend itself to substantial reductions below current levels of forces. Reductions should be to equal ceilings.
- o Easily understood. To gain support and hence underscore the credibility of the U.S. negotiating position, the approach we choose should be explainable in clear and simple terms.
- o Alliance impact. A START agreement should take into account Allied concerns: the ability of the U.S. to maintain a credible deterrent, the relationship of the START approach to the INF negotiations, and the likelihood of success.
- o Anticipated Soviet reaction. The Soviets will undoubtedly resist any of the reductions proposals now being considered. We should concern ourselves with how defensible the proposal is against Soviet propaganda efforts.

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